[dean]

If i havent done anything what could they possibly arrest me for? Because i dont want to tell them who i am?

If you're being detained and you refuse to identify yourself then yes, you can be arrested.

Just because legally the police are not allowed to detain you without RAS does not mean that they will not detain you without RAS.

Not all police all familiar with OC laws and some police may believe that simply carrying a firearm constitutes as RAS.

Since they're not required to tell you what their RAS is you're pretty much forced to hope that they don't have any legitimate RAS if you refuse to identify while being detained.

[David]

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), held that a police officer may not legally stop and frisk anyone based solely on an anonymous tip that simply described that person's location and what he or she might look like but that did not furnish information as to any illegal conduct that the person might be planning.

The United States Supreme Court held in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg that the search was unreasonable. That the tip accurately identified the defendant and that the allegation of the firearm ultimately proved to be accurate was insufficient to justify the seizure. For a completely anonymous tip to justify even a "stop and frisk" of a suspect pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), it must be "suitably corroborated" with both the accurate prediction of future activity of the subject[1] and accurate in its assertion of potential criminal activity. The tip given in the J.L. case was only sufficient to identify the subject and nothing more, making the police reliance upon it unjustified.

The Court further declined to create a standard "firearms exception" to the Terry doctrine, as was recognized in some Federal circuits, stating, among other things, that "Such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun . . ."[2]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_v._J.L.

[David]

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), held that statutes requiring suspects to disclose their names during police investigations did not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first required reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal involvement.

Under the rubric of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the minimal intrusion on a suspect's privacy, and the legitimate need of law enforcement officers to quickly dispel suspicion that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, justified requiring a suspect to disclose his name.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiibel_v._ ... _of_Nevada

[David]

In Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Supreme Court stated that, absent articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable.

[David]

When reviewing whether a search was justified by consent, a district court examines several issues. First, the government must show that the defendant consented based on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Freeman, 482 F.3d 829, 831-32 (5th Cir. 2007). Next, the government must show that this consent was voluntary, also based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 832 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)).

District courts focus on six factors to determine voluntariness:

(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse consent; (5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found. All six factors are relevant, but no single one is dispositive or controlling. Id. (quoting United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir. 1993)).

Third, the government must show that the search was within the scope of the consent. Id. (internal citations omitted). Scope of consent is governed by objective reasonableness: "what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991). The question of objective reasonableness is a question of law that we review de novo, although factual findings explicit in a district court's reasonableness decision are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Ibarra, 965 F.2d 1354, 1356-57, 1360 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); see also United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1990), and United States v. Tedford, 875 F.2d 446, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1989).

[cslade454]

From the news journal
"In the other incident, officers working with the department's drug, vice and organized crime unit answered a complaint about two armed men near South Jackson and Linden streets. The officers tried to stop the men, who fled. One man was caught at South Jackson and Maple streets, where he tossed away a loaded .357 Magnum., police said. Officers caught the second man at South Van Buren and Maple streets, where he tried to get rid of a loaded .40-caliber semiautomatic handgun. Police did not release the names of the suspects."

Everything I am reading here would seem to indicate that the police made an illegal stop. I am very glad they did though. Two less bad guys on the streets. Seems like a good thing to me.

FYI : ( not discussed) Wilmington has a curfew law that allows stops based on time of day.

[David]

From the news journal
"In the other incident, officers working with the department's drug, vice and organized crime unit answered a complaint about two armed men near South Jackson and Linden streets. The officers tried to stop the men, who fled. One man was caught at South Jackson and Maple streets, where he tossed away a loaded .357 Magnum., police said. Officers caught the second man at South Van Buren and Maple streets, where he tried to get rid of a loaded .40-caliber semiautomatic handgun. Police did not release the names of the suspects."

Everything I am reading here would seem to indicate that the police made an illegal stop. I am very glad they did though. Two less bad guys on the streets. Seems like a good thing to me.

FYI : ( not discussed) Wilmington has a curfew law that allows stops based on time of day.

An illegal stop is never a good thing and you will agree after it happens to you. Illegal stops lead to suppressed evidence and criminals who walk away with just a little more knowledge of how the system works.

[dean]

The officers tried to stop the men, who fled.

running from the police = RAS

[David]

They should have walked away instead.

If a defendant has a right to refuse to talk to an officer during an encounter, his walking away cannot be considered flight under Wardlow. United States v. Saroeuth, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40018 (E.D. Pa. April 12, 2011):

The evidence concerning whether Defendant fled is material to the Court's analysis, as Wardlow indicates that unprovoked flight constitutes evasive behavior, and is a factor in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, however, mere refusal to cooperate with the police does not support reasonable suspicion. Defendant argues that he was not fleeing the scene, but was merely exercising his lawful right to ignore police questioning and proceed on his way. The Court finds Defendant’s position supported by the aforementioned evidence. As Officer Newell approached Defendant, Defendant opted to ignore Officer Newell and peddle away, which at that point constituted a mere encounter. Thus, the Court cannot factor the Defendant’s provoked flight into its analysis of whether reasonable suspicion existed, as such flight occurred after the officers’ actions which constituted detention of Defendant.

The events leading up to the pursuit included a dispersing crowd in a high crime area, however, the people were walking, and not running away. Thus, no criminal activity was afoot when the officers arrived at the scene. Officer Newell testified that at the time of the incident, it was still daylight.

Further, despite the Officer’s contention that Defendant was agreeable during past interactions, it is unreasonable, and not “commonsense judgment”, as required by Wardlow, for officers to believe that Defendant should display the same agreeable nature under the circumstances on June 22, 2010. ...

ILLINOIS v. WARDLOW http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case? ... as_sdt=2,4

[David]

Officers went to a house for a knock-and-talk, admittedly with no justifiable information about criminal activity. When they knocked, somebody looked out the blinds, and then four people started bailing out the back sliding door. The last one was stopped, and detained, and, in plain view inside, drug paraphernalia could be seen. This view was a violation of the Fourth Amendment because there was no justification for a detention in the first place. Galindo-Eriza v. State, 306 Ga. App. 19, 701 S.E.2d 516 (2010):

Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances here did not provide the officers with the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary for elevating this first-tier encounter to a second-tier Terry stop. There was no testimony that these occupants of the house were specifically suspected of criminal activity or that the officers even knew who they were. In fact, the totality of the circumstances here consisted of the occupants running from a house that the police had on one occasion observed a suspected drug dealer enter. However, neither the occupants' presence in the house nor their running away from the officers could provide the officers with a reasonable articulable suspicion. In Black, supra, 281 Ga. App. at 44-47(1), we held that officers had no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify detaining or arresting an individual who had just left a residence that had been under surveillance for illegal drug activity. In State v. Mallard, we held that officers had no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify stopping a vehicle that had just left a residence upon which officers were preparing to execute a search warrant for marijuana. Here, as the testifying officers acknowledged, no warrant had been issued and no search was imminent. In State v. Harris, we found that officers had no reasonable articulable suspicion to detain a defendant based on nervousness and on defendant's cohort's exiting and then immediately returning to a motel room upon seeing police. In this matter, the mere fact that during this first-tier encounter the occupants of the house sought to "be let alone" by avoiding contact with police did not create an objective articulable suspicion. See Black, supra, 281 Ga. App. at 46(1); Harris, supra, 261 Ga. App. at 122. Accordingly, Galindo-Eriza's and the other occupants' exercise of their right to avoid police gave the officers no grounds to detain them and conduct an investigative stop.